In this paper we provide experimental evidence indicating that incentive contracts may undermine voluntary cooperation. This suggests that explicit incentives may have costly side effects that have been largely neglected by economists. In our experiments the undermining effect is so strong that the incentive contracts are less efficient than contracts without any incentives. Buyers, who are in the role of principals, nonetheless, prefer the incentive contracts because they allow them to appropriate a much larger share of the (smaller) total surplus and are, hence, more profitable for them. The undermining of voluntary cooperation through incentives is, in principle, consistent with models of inequity aversion and reciprocity. Additional experiments show, however, that the reduction of voluntary cooperation through incentives is partly due to a framing effect. If the incentive is framed as a price deduction the reduction of voluntary cooperation is much stronger compared to a situation where the incentive is framed as a bonus paid on top of a base price.
INTRODUCTION
Economic theories almost always rely in some way on the effectiveness of performance incentives. From the economist's viewpoint the question why certain actions are undertaken is closely related to the question which incentives the decisionmakers are facing. There can thus be little doubt that the effectiveness and the limits of performance incentives belong to the fundamental questions in economics. In this paper we examine experimentally how buyers in a buyer-seller relationship use the available incentives and to what extent the provision of performance incentives undermines the sellers' propensity to cooperate voluntarily.
Our results show that incentive contracts may undermine voluntary cooperation. In our experiments the reduction in voluntary cooperation is so strong that contracts providing explicit performance incentives are on average less efficient than fixedprice contracts that do not provide any performance incentives at all. This result contradicts the standard economic model predicting that the incentive contract will be more efficient than the contract without incentives. 1 In spite of the efficiency loss the buyers, as principals, have a material advantage from the provision of incentives because the incentive contracts allow them to reap a much larger share of the smaller surplus. Thus, the redistributive effect of incentive contracts is sufficiently strong to over-compensate the induced efficiency loss.
We also show that the undermining of voluntary cooperation is, in principle, consistent with models of inequity aversion and reciprocity that assume fully rational agents (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). However, additional experiments indicate that a significant part of the undermining effect is due to the negative framing of the explicit incentive. If the incentive is framed as a price deduction in case of malfeasance, the sellers are much less willing to cooperate voluntarily compared to a situation where a bonus is paid on top of a base compensation in case of appropriate performance. This difference in the behavior of sellers across frames occurs despite the fact that -in economic terms -the pricededuction-frame is identical to the bonus-frame. Therefore, most rational choice models of reciprocity and inequity aversion are not consistent with the framing effect.
2 1 For our purposes we define the standard economic model by two assumptions. First, individuals are fully rational and second, the individuals' objective function is defined in quite a narrow way in the sense that only income and the costs of effort matter. For seminal papers on the standard approach see, e.g., Holmström (1979) , Grossman and Hart (1983) , Hart and Holmström (1987) and Jewitt (1988) .
Interesting overviews about the empirical evidence are provided in Gibbons (1997) and Prendergast (1999) . 2 The potential exemption is the model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1999) , which generically exhibits a large number of equilibria in sequential games like the one considered in this paper. This
It seems that by framing incentives positively or negatively, perceptions of kindness and hostility, which are crucial for reciprocal responses, can be manipulated. The framing effect may, therefore, be due to a shift in the reference point that provides the basis for judging actions as hostile or kind. Different frames may, however, also affect the players' beliefs, which, in case of multiple equilibria, may induce the players to play a different equilibrium.
In our view these results are important because voluntary cooperation is a characteristic feature of many real world contexts. Whenever agents have discretion over the intensity or the type of activity they perform, voluntary cooperation is very valuable for principals. In case of the employment relationship, for instance, the relevance of voluntary cooperation is neatly confirmed by the extensive study of Bewley (1995 Bewley ( , 1999 ) who reports the following: "Managers claim that workers have so many opportunities to take advantage of employers that it is not wise to depend on coercion and financial incentives alone as motivators" (Bewley 1995, p. 252 ).
Voluntary cooperation is also often important in markets for complex production inputs like customized software. In these markets it is typically not possible to specify all the potential contingencies in a contract so that the buyers depend on the sellers' voluntary cooperation.
In the standard principal-agent approach the agents' objective function is, in general, assumed to be increasing and strictly concave in income, decreasing in effort and additively separable in the two arguments. This model provides the benchmark for our definition of voluntary cooperation: If agents determine their effort by maximizing the objective function assumed in the standard approach they do not cooperate voluntarily. If, in contrast, they work harder we speak of voluntary cooperation.
Voluntary cooperation may have different sources: Agents may be simply irrational or they may have an intrinsic preference for the activity. Agents may also work harder because they exhibit inequity aversion or a preference for reciprocity. Another possibility is that agents may want to gain the social approval of relevant reference agents by providing excess effort relative to their narrow material self-interest. The neglect of these sources of voluntary cooperation in the standard approach is no big problem as long as these factors do not interact with the incentives provided. 3 Yet, as means that, for a given incentive contract, multiple quality levels are consistent with equilibrium behavior of the sellers. If framing affects the selection of equilibria our framing result could be consistent with this model. 3 Occasionally voluntary cooperation has been taken into account. Holmström and Milgrom (1991) assume, e.g., that employee's are willing to provide positive effort levels in the absence of any performance incentives. This is a critical assumption for their conclusion that in a multi-tasking environment principals may do better if agents face no incentives at all.
our experiments suggest, explicit incentives may interact in important ways with inequity aversion, bounded rationality and reciprocity motives. In addition, they are likely to interact with social approval and, perhaps, also with task-specific intrinsic motivation. 4 There is a large literature in social psychology, which suggests that material rewards for a pleasant activity may decrease the intrinsic motivation to perform this activity (see, e.g. Deci and Ryan 1985) . 5 Frey (1993) and, in particular, Frey (1997) discuss the relevance of this literature to economics. Recently, there has been a debate regarding the validity of the empirical claims put forward in this literature (see, e.g.,
Cameron and Pierce 1994, Eisenberger and Cameron 1996, Deci, Koestner and Ryan (1999), Kunz and Pfaff 2002, Fehr and . In the concluding section we compare our results with the experiments and claims made in the social psychology literature. The most important difference concerns the fact that in our experiments the incentives are set by the principals while in the social psychology experiments the agents face predetermined incentives that have been set by the experimenter. This means that this type of experiment cannot capture motivational forces like inequity aversion or reciprocity arising from the interaction between principals and agents.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will describe the experimental design and the experimental procedures. In Section 3 we derive the behavioral predictions. Section 4 presents the results. In Section 5 we summarize our findings and provide a concluding discussion.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
The basic feature of our design is the comparison of two treatments in the context of a "gift exchange game" as developed by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) . The first treatment, providing the baseline, is the so-called "Trust-Treatment" (henceforth TT).
Its main purpose is to establish the extent of voluntary cooperation in the absence of performance incentives for cooperation. The second treatment is the "IncentiveTreatment" (henceforth IT). The IT is identical to the TT, with the exception that performance incentives for contractual compliance are introduced. To examine the reasons for the undermining of voluntary cooperation in the IT we have conducted an additional treatment, which we call Bonus Treatment (henceforth BT). We will present and discuss the BT in Section 4. In the current section we will describe the TT and the IT and the common procedural details that were implemented in all treatments.
The Trust-Treatment
The constituent game was a version of the "gift exchange game", which comprises three stages. In the first stage buyers make a contract offer, which consists of a fixed price p and a desired quality level q . In the second stage sellers can decide whether they want to accept one of the available contract offers made by the buyers. The third stage is entered only if sellers accept a contract offer. In the third stage they then choose their quality level. They are not committed by the buyer's desired quality level q , i.e., they may choose q ¹ q . In the experiments, a buyer's profit is given by:
vq is the return for the buyer as a function of the seller's actual quality q. In the experiments v = 100 and prices p have to obey 0 £ p £ 100. Actual and desired quality levels have to be elements of the set {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1}.
The seller's payoff in the experiment is given by
p -c(q)
if the contract is accepted; (2) u = 0 if no contract is concluded.
Quality q causes disutility c(q). In the experiments c(q) was determined according to Table 1 . 
The Incentive-Treatment
The basic difference between the IT and the TT is the buyers' possibility of punishing sellers in the IT whose quality choice falls short of q , provided the seller's shirking can be verified. In particular, buyers' contract offers in the IT also specify -in addition to p and q -a fine f that has to be paid to the buyer in case that q < q can be verified. Shirking can be verified with probability 0 < s < 1. With probability 1 -s
shirking cannot be verified and, hence, the buyer is committed to pay p. In the experiment the probability with which shirking could be verified was s = 1/3.
The fine had to obey the restriction 0 £ f £ 13. 6 All the other parameters and restrictions were the same as in the TT. In both treatments all the players knew their own payoff functions and the payoff functions of the trading partners, i.e., v, c(q) as given in Table 1 , s and the feasible values of p and f were known to all the players.
Both in the TT and the IT the buyers' marginal return from an increase in q is 10 while, according to Table 1 , the marginal cost of q is always much lower. There are thus high efficiency gains from higher levels of q and q = 10 is the first best level of q.
7 6 In reality there are often limits to principals' sanctioning possibilities. Some of these limitations are due to legal regulations, norms, or collective bargaining agreements. It is also possible that these limits arise endogenously because the monitoring technology is not perfect or there is a problem of "moral hazard" on the principals' side. In addition, agents may also face liquidity constraints prohibiting large fines. 7 One referee asked what would happen if the efficiency gains from higher q were lower. There is evidence that experimental subjects care positively for efficiency in non-strategic settings where one
Procedures and common features
After their arrival all the subjects were randomly allocated their roles as buyers and sellers, respectively. All subjects kept their role during the whole experiment. Every subject participated in one treatment only. The experiments were conducted manually.
After the subjects had been assigned their roles, sellers and buyers were sent to different rooms where they were seated remote from each other. Subjects first had to read their instructions (see Appendix) and then they had to answer a set of hypothetical questions to test their understanding of payoff calculations. The experiments started only after all the subjects had given correct answers to all the questions. Most subjects were able to answer the hypothetical questions in less than 10 minutes. Occasionally it happened that one or two subjects in a session needed more than 10 minutes.
In both treatments there were six subjects in the role of a buyer and eight subjects in the role of a seller. At the beginning buyers first had to decide privately on a contract offer and to enter it into a decision sheet. In the IT, after buyers had made their choice, they had to roll a six-sided die, which determined whether shirking, in case it occurred, could be verified. In particular, if the numbers 1 and 2 turned up, the seller's quality choice could be verified, i.e., in case of shirking the buyer could collect the specified fine f. If a number between 3 to 6 turned up, shirking was not verifiable.
After all the buyers had made their choice (and, in the IT, rolled the die) all contract offers were made public by writing them on the blackboard in the buyers' room. Then the buyers' contract offers were transmitted to the sellers' room, where they were also written on the blackboard. The sellers could then choose -in a random order -among the available contract offers. Each buyer could only employ one seller and each seller could only accept one job. Hence, there was an excess supply of sellers. Both buyers and sellers knew the exact number of players on each side of the market. The reason for this was that we wanted to prevent buyers from offering high prices simply because they feared the rejection of their offers. 8 player can unilaterally dictate the whole allocation of material payoffs (Engelmann and Strobl 2002) . In strategic settings, however, efficiency considerations do not seem to affect players' social preferences. Fehr and List (2002) have conducted trust games in which the efficiency of the back-transfer of the second-mover varied. In the baseline condition the second-mover had to spend $1 to increase the firstmover's payoff by $1. In the high-efficiency condition the first-movers' payoff increased by $3 for every $1 the second mover spent on the back-transfer. Yet, in both conditions the second-movers spent the same amount on back-transfers indicating the absence of an efficiency motive. 8 After we had conducted our experiments we became aware of the work of Brandts and Charness (2001) who report the remarkable result that prices and quality in gift exchange markets are the same regardless of whether the number of sellers is below or above the number of buyers. This indicates that competition has little or no impact on outcomes in gift exchange markets.
Sellers who accepted a contract had to determine their actual quality level. They had to insert their choice into a decision sheet. In the IT they had to make this decision before knowing whether their quality choice could be verified. However, immediately after they had made their choice they were privately informed about verification, i.e., whether they would have to pay the fine in case of shirking. 9 After a seller had determined his quality, the experimenter informed the respective buyer (and nobody else) of the actual quality level. Thus quality levels were private information of the two parties involved in a trade. This setting rules out any group effects regarding the choice of quality levels. At the end of the third stage buyers and sellers had to calculate their payoffs. After payoffs had been calculated a new market was opened.
To allow for learning and to test the robustness of decisions, we had twelve periods (called "trading days") in which the above-described market was operative. All the players in the market knew this.
In the experiment we avoided potential value-laden terms. Therefore, the fine was described in a neutral way as a "potential price deduction". The instructions in the Appendix provide further details on the framing of terms.
Before we put forward our behavioral predictions we want to stress that our experimental procedures ensured that nobody was ever informed of the trading partner's identity. Thus, a player who concluded a contract only knew that this contract was concluded with somebody on the other side of the market. Players did not know the identification numbers of their trading partners nor did they know their current trading partner's past behavior. It was thus completely impossible for a player to gain an individual reputation. 10 Note also that buyers could not make offers to specific sellers. They only could make offers to the market, i.e., the whole group of sellers, and then individual sellers could accept one of the available offers in a random order. Thus, even if sellers would have had the opportunity to gain an individual reputation for, e.g., being a high quality seller, it would have been impossible for them to gain from this reputation because it was impossible for the buyers to select their trading partner. All these experimental procedures were implemented to enhance the one-shot nature of a trading day. 9 We also informed the non-shirkers whether they would have had to pay the fine if they had shirked. This was done to enhance the credibility of our random verification procedure. Technically, sellers were informed about verification by checking the appropriate box on their decision sheets (see instructions in the Appendix). Thus, since all the sellers were informed about verification they could not identify the shirkers among them. 10 In this regard it is also important that the offers were written on the blackboard in a random order. We implemented a random order to prevent possible identification of buyers. Therefore, it was not possible that individual buyers could gain a reputation for particular offers.
In total we conducted 13 sessions with 8 buyers and 6 sellers each. In the IT we ran four and in the TT five sessions. In addition, we conducted 4 sessions in the Bonus Treatment (BT) to examine framing effects. In total 182 undergraduates from the universities in Zurich participated in our experiments. All the participants were recruited from a large database to minimize the likelihood that they know each other.
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In principle, losses were possible in our experiments. Therefore, we endowed all subjects with an additional amount of 9 Swiss Francs. All losses had to be covered by 
BEHAVIORAL PREDICTIONS

Behavior in the Trust Treatment
Due to the one-shot nature of our game, a rational seller whose preferences are given by (2) will always choose the minimal quality q min because higher quality levels are costly and yield no return. Consequently, the buyer will offer the minimal price that is necessary to induce the seller to accept the contract, i.e., the buyer offers p = 1. 11 A post-experimental questionnaire confirmed that indeed most subjects had never met another participant before. 12 Price offers had to be integers. Therefore, if sellers have selfish preferences a price offer of 1 can be an equilibrium outcome. Of course, price offers of zero can also be an equilibrium outcome. In the following we always concentrate on the strict equilibrium in which sellers are strictly better off when they accept the contract.
the performance incentives they themselves face but also by the perceived fairness of the payoff allocation resulting from the contract offer.
Quite an extensive literature has emerged discussing the different motivational sources of social preferences. The literature is based on the development of formal models of inequity aversion, reciprocity and spitefulness and on a large set of experiments that isolate the different motivational sources for non-selfish behaviors. Rabin (1993) , Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1999) and Falk and Fischbacher (1999) have developed reciprocity models while Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) developed models of inequity aversion. A reciprocal individual responds to actions that are perceived to be kind in a kind manner, and to actions that are perceived to be hostile in a hostile manner. Whether an action is perceived as kind or hostile depends on the fairness or unfairness of the consequences and the intention associated with the action. The fairness of the intention, in turn, is determined by the equitability of the payoff distribution, relative to the set of feasible payoff distributions, caused by the action. Inequity aversion models, in contrast, do not depend explicitly on the perceived fairness or unfairness of the intentions but they also rely on the perceived fairness of the actions' consequences.
Intuitively it is easy to see that reciprocity or inequity aversion models predict that sellers voluntarily cooperate, i.e., choose q > q min , in response to generous contract offers. Reciprocal sellers infer kind intentions from generous offers and, therefore, they reciprocate (see, e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2000). Inequity averse sellers are willing to put forward non-minimal quality levels in response to generous prices because by raising the quality level they can implement outcomes that they perceive as more equitable. To illustrate this let us consider a simplified version of the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) . In the two-player case the utility function of an inequity averse (i.e., fair) player is given by advantageous inequality. 13 For convenience we use a grossly simplified version of this 13 In principle, inequity aversion is not the same as inequality aversion. For laboratory experiments inequality aversion may, however, be a good first approximation of inequity aversion. The subjects typically enter the laboratory as equals, they don't know anything about each other, and they are allocated to different roles in the experiment at random. Thus, it seems natural to assume that the egalitarian outcome constitutes a salient reference point.
model because the purpose of the subsequent deliberations is not to provide precise quantitative predictions but to illustrate some important qualitative regularities arising from inequity averse preferences. 14 We assume that fair subjects exhibit a i ³ b i = 0.5.
In a dictator game subjects with such preferences are willing to give 50 percent of the money to the recipient whereas when being in the responder role in an ultimatum game they reject offers that give them less than 25 percent of the available money. We also assume that -at the quality stage of the experiment -the only reference player for the seller is his buyer. This allows us to use the two-person utility function above to study the quality behavior of the sellers. We believe that this assumption approximates the subjects' perception of the situation well because they do not know the quality that is provided in other trades. In addition, once a contract has been concluded the buyer has clearly a salient position for a seller in our experiment.
Once a fair seller with the above preferences has accepted a contract in the TT he will, for sufficiently high prices, choose a quality level such that p = 100q -p = p -c(q) = u holds. 15 Differentiation of this equation shows that quality responds to a price change according to dq/dp = 2/[100+c'(q)] > 0. Thus, by raising the seller's price sufficiently such that u > p holds at q min , the seller is induced to choose a payoff equalizing quality level, which we denote by q e , and the higher the price the higher will be q e . An immediate consequence of this is that if the fraction of fair sellers is sufficiently high, even purely selfish buyers have an incentive to pay generous prices.
Previous experimental research has shown that in games that are similar to our TT quality levels are indeed positively affected by prices and that -for certain price ranges -the buyers can raise their profits by raising prices (for overviews see, e.g., 
Behavior in the Incentive Treatment
Analogous to the TT we first discuss the behavioral predictions for the case that all the buyers and sellers are selfish and rational. A selfish seller will accept a contract in the IT if the participation constraint 14 To generate more precise quantitative predictions at the individual level it would, e.g., be necessary that b varies with the amount of advantageous inequality. If b is constant the agent either prefers full equality or does not care for equality at all. 15 Of course, if the price is so low that for all feasible quality levels p > u holds the seller chooses q min .
holds. In (6) q* denotes the quality level that maximizes the seller's material payoff. A rational and selfish risk-neutral seller who has accepted a contract will perform at the desired quality level (i.e., q = q ) if the No-Shirking Condition (NSC)
is satisfied. 17 The seller will perform at the desired level if the expected fine sf for shirking is larger than the costs of contractual compliance, which are given by Table 1 ). It is easy to check that with our parameterization of s = 1/3 and f £ 13 quality costs of 4.33 can be enforced. Hence, according to the quality cost function in Table 1 , the largest quality level that can be enforced by an incentive compatible contract, which we denote by * q , is given by * q = 0.4. More generally, the best reply quality choice q* of a risk-neutral seller who is rational and selfish is given by:
Since the marginal revenue of quality is 10 while the marginal cost of quality is always strictly below 10, a profit-maximizing buyer who keeps the seller at her reservation utility, will always prefer the highest enforceable quality level * q = 0.4.
We can summarize the above discussion for the IT in the following behavioral prediction: If all the subjects are selfish and rational we will observe that sellers accept all contracts obeying p ³ c(q*) and choose the quality level q* according to (8) .
Buyers, therefore, offer the contract
. 18 Note that if this prediction is met q -q* will be zero, i.e., there will be no voluntary cooperation. Moreover, sellers' behavior then will not respond to variations in the price offered so that it is not possible to induce positive voluntary cooperation (q -q* > 0) by offering a generous price. In addition, self-interested sellers will not reduce their quality below q* in response to low prices. 17 To derive our benchmark predictions we assume that subjects in our experiment are risk neutral because, as Rabin (2000) has shown, assuming risk aversion over the typical stake levels in laboratory experiments is highly implausible. Even small degrees of risk aversion over typical experimental stakes imply an absurd degree of risk aversion over large stakes. 18 There is another, non-strict subgame perfect equilibrium, in which p = 4, f = 13, * q = 0.4 holds and where the seller accepts the contract and chooses q* = 0.4. For empirical purposes the slight difference between these two equilibria is negligible. The situation again is substantially different if we account for the presence of reciprocal or inequity averse sellers. To keep the exposition simple we again concentrate on the case of inequity averse sellers as described in the previous subsection. If an inequity averse seller faces a contract (p, q , f) such that q is below q e , the seller will never shirk. Instead, the seller will choose q e > q (see Figure 1 ). This means that for all contracts in which q < q e an inequity averse seller exhibits the same behavior as in the TT. In these contracts the fine does not affect the seller's response because the seller does not consider performing below q . The situation changes, however, if q is above q e . In this case an inequity averse seller would, in principle, prefer to reduce the quality to q e but if he does so he faces the threat of being fined. An inequity averse seller who decides to shirk may end up in one of two situations. With probability s he will be caught shirking and will have to pay the fine f.
If the seller knew for sure that he would end up in this situation he would choose a quality level such that the payoff difference between the buyer's payoff 100q -p + f and his own payoff p -c(q) -f is removed. In Figure 1 we denote this quality by q f .
With probability 1 -s shirking will not be verified and the seller does not have to pay a fine. If the seller knew for sure that he would end up in this situation he would choose the quality level q e (see Figure 1) . Thus, in case of shirking, the seller's quality will be between q f and q e . 19 Since ex-ante the seller does not know in which situation he will end up his utility from shirking U s is given by
We can examine the conditions under which a shirking seller prefers to provide q f .
Differentiation of U s with respect to quality gives ¶U
It is easy to see that this expression is always negative if sa -(1-s)b is positive. When this is the case the utility from shirking is maximized at q f . Thus, if the seller's inequity aversion is sufficiently biased against disadvantageous inequality (i.e., a ³ 2b
for s = 1/3) a shirking seller prefers to reduce the quality provided below the egalitarian quality q e that would be chosen if there were no fine or if the buyer demanded a quality at or below q e . In other words, once the seller has decided to shirk 19 If at q min the buyer's payoff, 100q -p + f, is still bigger than the seller's payoff, p -c(q) -f, the seller chooses q such that q min £ q £ q e holds.
the existence of the fine has a counterproductive effect because the shirking seller chooses a lower quality with the fine than without the fine. This is, of course, not the only effect of the fine because the fine also affects whether the seller decides to shirk.
FIGURE 1
Inequity aversion and quality choice To see this in more detail we write the utility from non-shirking, U ns , as
The term in parenthesis measures the difference between the buyer's and the seller's payoff at q . The seller prefers to perform at q if U ns ³ U s holds. Using (9) and (10) the non-shirking condition can be written as
Intuitively, the right hand side of (11) measures the pecuniary and the non-pecuniary gains from shirking: c( q ) -c(q) -sf measures the monetary gains from shirking while a[100 q -p -(p -c( q ))] measures the non-pecuniary inequality costs associated with the proposed contract. By shirking the seller can avoid these non-pecuniary costs. The left-hand side of (11) measures the non-pecuniary inequality costs that arise from shirking. Note that if the seller chooses q f the first term on the left side vanishes while if the seller chooses q e the second term on the left side vanishes. Condition (11) shows that, by decreasing the monetary gains from shirking, the fine deters shirking. In addition, (11) indicates that the inequality associated with the contract is also a decisive shirking determinant. The more unequal the payoff distribution of a proposed contract the more likely it is that the seller shirks. Finally, the non-shirking condition also highlights the important role of q for the shirking decision. While in the TT q represents only cheap talk, in the IT a higher level of q makes it more likely that the non-shirking condition is violated. In case that q exceeds q e a rise in q increases the monetary gains as well as the non-pecuniary gains from shirking.
The previous discussion shows that in the presence of inequity aversion the incentive contract may not necessarily do better than a pure trust contract -in fact it may even do worse. However, inequity aversion is not the only, and perhaps not even the most important, reason why the incentive contract may do worse. Incentive contracts may also cause negative side effects if reciprocity motives alone are present.
Remember that reciprocity means that sellers respond in a hostile manner to actions that reveal a hostile intention. In our view the fining of sellers may reveal hostile intentions for two reasons. 20 First, the fine per se may be perceived as hostile. Second, threatening to fine a seller is an indication of distrust. To the extent to which trusting actions are perceived as kind and distrusting actions as hostile, a fine will be perceived as a hostile act. Whatever the true reason for perceiving somebody's intention as hostile, if the sellers perceive the fine as a hostile act they may no longer be willing to put forward the same quality compared to a situation with no fine.
RESULTS
In the following we first describe the results for the TT and the IT. Then we move on to discussing the BT. In the TT buyers offered 357 contracts in total, of which all but one were accepted. In the IT the total number of offered contracts was 287 and 7 of them (2.4 percent) were rejected. Before we provide a detailed statistical analysis of subjects' voluntary cooperation behavior we present the evidence at a more descriptive level. Our first result provides insights into the average contract offered by the buyers in the TT and the IT.
Result 1: In the TT buyers offer, on average, higher prices and demand higher quality levels than in the IT. The average fine in the IT is close to the maximum fine.
Support for R1 is provided in Table 2 . Table 2 summarizes the average behavior over all the periods in the IT and the TT and compares them with the predictions of the self-interest model for both treatments. It shows that the average price offered in the TT is considerably higher than in the IT. The same regularity is exhibited by median prices. The median price is more than two times larger in the TT than in the IT. Table   2 also provides information on the average and median fines. Note that the median fine is exactly the maximal fine of f = 13. In fact, buyers in the IT imposed the maximum fine in 69 percent of all cases and only in 4 contracts they chose f = 0. It is, therefore, not surprising that the average fine is close to the maximal fine. Table 2 also indicates that q is considerably larger in the TT. On average, q = 0.65 in the TT while buyers desire only q = 0.49 in the IT. The frequent use of maximal fines together with the considerably lower prices in the IT conveys the impression that buyers in the IT relied to a large extent on the "stick" and much less on the "carrot" compared to the TT. It is, therefore interesting to see how this strategy is related to actual quality levels and to the sellers' willingness to cooperate voluntarily. A first indication for R2 is given in Table 2 , which shows that the mean actual quality level is lower in the IT. Further support for R2 is provided by Figure 2 , which presents the distributions of actual quality levels. The figure shows that the distribution of quality has considerably more mass at lower levels in the IT. This is also confirmed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov-test (prob < 0.001). In particular, in the IT only 7.5 percent of quality levels are above 0.5, whereas in the TT quality levels above 0. The first interesting result in Table 3 regularities also mean that, on average, sellers in the IT provide less than the best reply quality when they face incentive compatible contracts. This result is also confirmed by Figure 3 which shows that the average quality for incentive compatible contracts (see IT-IC-graph) is generally below q*. Note: Entries are number of cases in the respective category. q* denotes the best reply quality choice according to (8) . This result is, however, consistent with inequity aversion and notions of reciprocity.
For instance, once inequity averse sellers have decided to shirk they are fined with positive probability. This will, in general, induce them to perform less than what they would be willing to provide in the TT. Thus, the considerably lower quality levels for non-incentive compatible contracts in the IT can be taken as an indication that voluntary cooperation is undermined by the use of fines. The graphical results depicted in Figure 3 are also confirmed by more detailed econometric analyses of voluntary cooperation in the TT and the IT. For the TT we regressed (q -q*) on a constant, prices and the desired quality level. Our regressions take into account that the dependent variable is censored at zero and the reported standard errors are based on the fact that only observations across sessions are independent while observations within a given session are dependent. Table 4 The results of our econometric analysis of voluntary cooperation for the IT are reported in Table 5 where we regressed q -q* on a constant and a dummy IC for incentive compatible contracts. We also interacted the IC-dummy and a dummy for non-incentive compatible contracts (NIC) with prices p it and desired quality levels it q .
Most importantly, the table shows that p it interacted with NIC is close to zero and never significant. This indicates that for non-incentive compatible contracts prices have no effect on voluntary cooperation. Prices have a small significant impact for incentive compatible contracts -the higher the price the lower is on average the sellers' shirking. A further interesting result is that the desired quality level has a negative impact on voluntary cooperation. Recall that in the TT q had a positive but insignificant impact between periods 5 and 12 indicating that q represents cheap talk.
However, for the incentive compatible contracts in the IT q has a large negative impact on voluntary cooperation during these periods. In addition, q also has a negatively significant impact in non-incentive compatible contracts for the data of all periods as well as for the data in the final three periods. is an interaction between q and the dummy IC (NIC). Rejected contract offers are excluded. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1-, 5-and 10-percent level, respectively.
The negative impact of q on voluntary cooperation in the IT is not compatible with the standard model. If sellers are rational and self-interested they provide the desired quality in case of incentive compatible contracts and they fully shirk in case of nonincentive compatible contracts. In the context of the standard model a higher q may render a contract non-incentive compatible if the higher value of q violates the noshirking condition sf ³ c( q ). But within the class of incentive compatible contracts and within the class of non-incentive compatible contracts, higher values of q will not affect voluntary cooperation and underperformance. Yet, if sellers are, e.g., inequity averse then a higher desired quality level may well affect voluntary cooperation and underperformance. This is so because, in addition to the pecuniary costs of shirking, variations in q also affect the perceived fairness of the contract offer in the IT. As our discussion of the NSC (11) for inequity averse sellers has shown a higher level of q will increase the non-pecuniary gains from shirking. Thus, even if a rise in q leaves the NSC for selfish sellers (i.e. sf ³ c( q )) intact the rise may nevertheless violate the NSC for inequity averse sellers because it is also associated with an increase in the non-pecuniary gains from shirking. This shows that in case that the NSC for selfish sellers is met inequity averse sellers may increase underperformance in response to a rise in q . Likewise, it can be shown that if the NSC for selfish sellers, sf ³ c( q ), is already violated an inequity averse seller may reduce voluntary cooperation in response to an increase in q . To see this assume that sf ³ c( q ) is violated and that q is initially below q e -inducing the inequity averse seller to provide q = q e initially. Assume further that the rise in q renders q larger than q e . From our discussion in Section 3.2 we know that inequity averse sellers may well respond to this by reducing quality below q e .
In view of R2 it is interesting to what extent the reduction of voluntary
cooperation reduces the total surplus S, defined as the total material payoffs from a contract, in the IT relative to the TT. Before we present this result it is worthwhile to emphasize that the standard model implies that S is more than two times higher in the IT than in the TT. However, in stark contrast to this hypothesis we can report the following result:
Result 3: The total surplus S is on average higher in the TT than in the IT. This holds irrespective of whether we compare the TT-contracts with incentive compatible or with non-incentive compatible IT-contracts. The profit for the buyers is highest for incentive compatible contracts, second highest for TT-contracts and lowest for nonincentive compatible IT-contracts.
R3 basically means that the incentive opportunities in the IT allow buyers to increase their profits relative to the TT but that this is associated with an efficiency loss.
Support for R3 is presented in Table 6 , which compares the actual with the predicted surplus and shows buyers' and sellers' average profits from a contract. Note first that in the TT the realized surplus equals 33 while it is only 21.5 for non-incentive compatible contracts and 27.5 for incentive compatible contracts. Thus, relative to the surplus predicted by the standard model for the TT we observe a more efficient outcome in the TT that is due to sellers' voluntary cooperation. To a lesser extent this is also true for those IT-contracts that are not incentive compatible. However, actual efficiency is lower than the predicted efficiency for incentive compatible contracts. Table 6 A first piece of evidence in favor of R4 is given in Figure 3 and Tables 4 and 5 can affect the sellers' quality choices negatively. In the TT it does not matter for an inequity averse seller whether q is low or high -the seller can always choose the egalitarian quality level q e without having to face any negative consequences in case that the buyer demanded more than q e . In the IT, however, an inequity averse seller who faces q > q e has the following problem. If he provides q he incurs non-pecuniary costs from the unfair offer. If he wants to correct the unfairness by providing less than q he faces the threat of being punished, which will in general induce him to choose quality levels even below q e because the pending punishment will change the payoff distribution unfavorably for the seller. A necessary condition for the effectiveness of this mechanism is that the sellers in the IT did face a large number of contracts with q > q e . It turns out that this was indeed the case. In 84 percent of all contract offers in the IT q > q e prevailed. Interestingly, in 76 percent of the contract offers in the TT q also exceeded q e . The fact, that in the TT voluntary cooperation prevailed despite the existence of a large majority of offers with q > q e lends support to the argument that unfair offers are more likely to reduce voluntary cooperation in the IT because the threat of being fined causes further disadvantageous changes in the payoff distribution.
The above argument is, however, not the only possible reason for the breakdown of voluntary cooperation in the IT. We already mentioned in Section 3.2 that fines designed to elicit high quality levels may be perceived as hostile per se. In addition, explicit incentives may be perceived as a signal of distrust and to the extent to which distrust is perceived as unkind, reciprocally motivated sellers respond to the fine with unkind quality levels. We also conjectured that the perception of the incentive device as kind or unkind could be subject to framing effects. If the same incentive is framed in a positive manner it may perhaps be possible to prevent the reduction of voluntary cooperation. To test this conjecture we have conducted the so-called Bonus Treatment (BT).
The BT is just a reframing of the IT. The only difference between the IT and the BT is that in the IT a shirking seller has to pay a fine f if caught shirking while in the BT a shirking seller is not paid the bonus b if caught shirking. While in the IT a contract consists of (p, q , f) the buyers in the BT stipulate contracts (p o , q , b) where p o denotes the base price and b obeys 0 £ b £ 13. Note that the bonus in the BT obeys the same constraints as the fine in the IT. Likewise, the probability that the bonus is not paid out in case of shirking is identical to the probability that the fine has to be paid. Thus, while in the IT the seller faces the threat of having to pay the fine f with probability s, in the BT the seller faces the isomorphic threat of not earning the bonus b with probability s. 24 should behave identically. This is so because all these models rely on rational behavior and predict a unique quality response to any given contract. Thus, rational agents in the BT who face -in economic terms -the same contract as in the IT should behave identically in the two situations. Yet, as our next result shows there are large behavioral differences across IT and BT.
Result 5: Voluntary cooperation is much lower in the IT compared to the BT. Yet, in the BT voluntary cooperation is lower than in the TT.
We provide support for R5 in Figure 6 and in Table 7 . Figure 6 shows voluntary cooperation as a function of the offered total compensation. In the TT and the IT the offered total compensation in case of q = q was equal to the price. In the BT the offered total compensation for q = q was equal to p o + b. Figure 6 indicates that voluntary cooperation is highest in the TT, somewhat lower in the BT and lowest in 24 Recall that in the experimental instructions for the IT we did not use the term fine. We used instead the terms "potential price deduction" from the agreed upon price. In the instructions for the BT we used the term "potential supplementary price" that was paid in addition to the agreed upon price.
the IT. Moreover, the figure also suggests that while voluntary cooperation does not respond to total compensation in the IT, it responds positively in the TT and the BT. 
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The impression conveyed by Figure 6 is confirmed by a comparison of regression results in Tables 4 and 5 with those in Table 7 . In Table 7 we present the regressions for the BT. In contrast to the regressions for the IT (see Table 5 ) the coefficient for p it´N IC is significantly positive indicating that the compensation offered in case of non-incentive compatible contracts has a positive impact on voluntary cooperation in the BT. This effect prevails in all three time periods considered as well as for the overall regression in Table 7 . However, a comparison of the coefficient for the compensation for non-incentive compatible contracts, p it´N IC, in Table 7 with the slope for p it in the TT (see Table 4 ) indicates that the slope in the BT is generally flatter. The null hypothesis of equal slopes can be rejected at the p = .024 level of significance indicating that increases in monetary compensation led to larger increases in voluntary cooperation in the TT. Note: The estimation procedure is censored regression with robust standard errors. IC denotes a dummy for the nonincentive compatible contracts and pit measures the total compensation (p o +b) in case of q = q . pit´IC is an interaction variable of the IC dummy with pit. pit´NIC is an interaction variable of pit with a dummy NIC, which denotes non-incentive compatible contracts. it q´IC ( it q´NIC) measures the interaction between q and the dummy IC (NIC). Rejected contract offers are excluded. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1-, 5-and 10-percent level, respectively.
The considerably higher levels of voluntary cooperation in the BT relative to the IT indicate that the framing of incentives matters. There are, in our view, two potential explanations for the framing effect. One explanation relies on a combination of the notion of reciprocity with a specific aspect of bounded rationality. 25 The other explanation relies on the existence of multiple equilibria in the DufwenbergKirchsteiger model of reciprocity. Recall that the definition of reciprocity depends on the notion of kind and hostile actions. What is perceived as kind or hostile depends, in turn, inevitably on a neutral reference point. The presence of a framing effect is consistent with the view that the reference point, which provides the basis for 25 Selten (1998) also argues that there are interactions between bounded rationality and reciprocity.
categorizing an action as kind or hostile, can be manipulated by the framing of the incentive. In the negative frame the total compensation in case of non-shirking seems to provide a natural reference point and the fine focuses attention on the fact that something will be taken away in case of verified shirking. In the positive frame the base compensation is the natural reference point and the bonus focuses attention on the fact that something will be given if the desired quality is provided. It may well be that "taking away something" is perceived as less friendly than "not giving something" even if the total compensation is identical.
A prominent feature of the Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger model is that in sequential games like ours the model typically exhibits a host of equilibria. 26 Some of these equilibria are characterized by mutual kindness whereas others are characterized by mutual hostility. In principle, it is therefore possible that the framing of the incentive affects the players' beliefs and as a consequence the sellers choose different quality levels in the different frames. If, for example, the fine changes the players beliefs such that they coordinate on an equilibrium with mutual hostility whereas the bonus induces beliefs such that they coordinate on an equilibrium with mutual kindness a framing effect arises.
The above interpretations are, of course, ex-post rationalizations of the evidence that require further thought and experiments. To examine the validity of the second interpretation it would, in particular, be necessary to measure the players' beliefs.
Having said this, it is also worthwhile to point out that an important part of the inequity averse and the buyers demand quality levels above the egalitarian quality q e the sellers incur non-pecuniary inequity costs if they provide the demanded quality level. However, if they want to avoid the inequity costs by providing less than the demanded quality they are fined with positive probability. This causes a further disadvantageous change in the payoff distribution. As a consequence, inequity averse sellers will, in general, provide quality below q e when they face a threat of being fined while in the absence of this threat they are willing to provide q e .
Further experiments show, however, that an interpretation of the observed counterproductive incentive effect in terms of inequity aversion cannot tell the whole story. If the available incentive is framed as a bonus that is paid in addition to a base compensation voluntary cooperation is, ceteris paribus, significantly higher than in a situation in which the incentive is framed as a price deduction. In the bonus frame voluntary cooperation again responds positively to the price level. This framing effect is compatible with the view that perceptions of kindness and hostility, which are crucial for reciprocal quality responses, can be manipulated by the framing of incentives. The framing effect may, therefore, be due to a shift in the reference point that provides the basis for judging actions as hostile or kind. The framing effect is, however, also consistent with the Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger model of reciprocity. This model typically exhibits multiple equilibria and to the extent to which different frames coordinate players on different equilibria a framing effect occurs.
Our experiment and our conclusions differ in several important ways from the social psychology literature that aims at testing the undermining of intrinsic motivation through monetary rewards (Cameron and Pierce 1994, Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999). 27 First, and perhaps most importantly, in the psychological experiments no principals are present, i.e., the experimental subjects are always confronted with an incentive that is exogenously set by the experimenter. However, as our discussion in and an agent and variations in the perceived fairness of the principal's action. Thus, 27 For a critical evaluation of this literature from the behavioral economics viewpoint see Fehr and Falk (2002) .
the psychological forces stemming from the relation between principal and agent are absent in the experiments on intrinsic motivation. Instead, the subjects in these experiments are engaged in an activity that is assumed to be intrinsically pleasurable. Second, on the basis of the psychological experiments it is not possible to judge the economic importance of the undermining of intrinsic motivation because the value of the output of the activity is not determined. This is relevant insofar as the incentive may affect intrinsic motivation negatively but this negative effect may be overcompensated by the positive effect of extrinsic motivation on quality so that overall efficiency is nonetheless enhanced by the incentive.
Third, the proponents of an undermining effect claim that even flat payments reduce intrinsic motivation (Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999) . This is highly 
General Information (identical for buyers and sellers)
• In this experiment there are buyers and sellers. The experiment comprises 12 trading periods.
• Each trading day consists of two stages. At the first stage each buyer decides on an offer, which contains the conditions under which the buyer is prepared to buy a commodity from a seller. Such an offer consists of a price, a desired quality and a potential price deduction. There are ten possible quality levels.
• At the second stage a random mechanism determines an order according to which the sellers can choose among the available offers. No seller is obliged to accept a bid, and no buyer is forced to make an offer. All sellers who have accepted an offer, have to decide which quality they will actually deliver. Choosing a quality level entails costs for the seller. After the seller has determined the "actual quality" the respective buyer will be informed about it.
• In principle the seller can choose a quality level that is higher, equal, or lower than the desired quality. If the actual quality is lower than the desired quality, then the potential price deduction specified in the contract is due with a probability of 33.3 percent. Hence, with a lower than the desired quality, the specified price deduction is on average due in one out of three cases. The seller will only learn after his actual quality choice whether the price deduction is due or not. A trading day is over after all sellers who have accepted an offer, have determined their actual quality and all bargaining partners have been informed whether there is a price deduction.
• There are more sellers than buyers. All sellers and buyers know this. Each seller (or buyer, resp.) can only sell (buy) one unit per trading day. In the following you will find an exact description of the stages, i.e., which decisions are possible, and an exact description of how payoffs are calculated.
Detailed Information for Buyers
In the market a certain commodity is traded and each seller sells the same commodity. Each seller can sell to each buyer and each buyer can buy from each seller. The market is organized as follows. We open the market for a trading day and you will receive from us 100 points for each commodity that you buy. This amount is the same for all buyers. Each buyer and each seller knows that you will receive 100 points per unit of the commodity. You now have the possibility to make an offer. An offer consists of a price, a desired quality and a potential price deduction. For making an offer the following rules hold: 1. Per trading day you are only allowed to make one offer. You are not obliged to make an offer.
2.
Concerning the "desired quality" the following holds: There are ten possible quality levels, from which you can choose your desired quality. The lowest quality is 0.1 and the highest one is 1. Below, the impact of the seller's delivered quality on your payoff will be described in more detail. It holds true that your payoff in points is the higher the higher the delivered quality is. A quality choice entails quality costs for the seller. On the leaflet you will find the table with all feasible quality levels and the associated quality costs! All sellers have the same cost schedule. 3. The price can at most be 100 and has at least to cover the seller's quality cost. For example, if you ask for the quality level 0.3, you have to offer at least a price of 2, for a quality of 0.3 entails costs of 2 units for the seller. Prices have to be in integers. In summary, for the determination of the price the following rule holds:
100 ≥ price ≥ quality costs. 4. The potential price deduction has not to be lower than 0 and larger than 13:
13 ≥ potential price deduction ≥ 0. The potential price deduction has to be stated in integers. If you have decided on a price, a potential price deduction and a desired quality, please insert them in the box "proposed offer" on your decision sheet. After you have made your offer, you have to roll a six-sided die. Rolling the die determines whether the price deduction is due in case of an under-provision of the desired quality. The following rule hold: If the numbers 1 or 2 show up (with a probability of 1/3) the price deduction is exacted in case of an under-provision; if the numbers 3, 4, 5, or 6 show up, the price deduction will not be implemented. Please insert the result in the box "Price deduction due in case of under-provision?" on your decision sheet. Your offer will be written on the blackboard and transmitted to the sellers. In the sellers' room all offers on a trading day will be written on the blackboard in a random order. Moreover, on each trading day a random mechanism determines the order according to which sellers are allowed to choose among the offers. The sellers will not learn which buyer has made which offer and you as a buyer will not learn which seller has accepted which offer. Each seller can only accept one offer per trading day. The sellers cannot make counteroffers. 
Detailed Information for Sellers
In the market a certain commodity is traded and each seller sells the same commodity. Each seller can sell to each buyer and each buyer can buy from each seller. Each buyer receives from us on each trading day 100 points, which he can use for buying a commodity. All buyers and sellers know this. The organization of the market is as follows: We open the market for one trading day. First, without communicating with other buyers, each buyer can make an offer. An offer consists of a price, a desired quality and a potential price deduction. There are ten possible quality levels from which the buyer, and you as a seller, respectively, can choose. The lowest quality is 0.1 and the highest quality is 1. The impact of the quality of the delivered good on the payoffs will below be described in more detail. In general, however, it holds true that a high quality increases your cost and the payoff of the buyer. On the leaflet you will find a table with all possible quality levels and the associated quality costs of your quality choice. The next step after all buyers had the opportunity to make an offer, is the transmission of the offers to this room where the offers will be written on the blackboard in a random order. You will not learn which buyer made which offer. Now a random device determines the order according to which you as a seller can choose among the offers. We implement this as follows. You have to draw one out of 8 cards that are numbered from 1 to 8. The seller who picks card no. 1 is the first who has the opportunity to pick an offer; the seller who draws card no. 2 is the second to pick an offer, and so on. You will make your choice as follows:
When it is your turn to make a choice, you state your seller number and your chosen offer.
On a trading day you can accept only one offer. You are not obliged to accept an offer. The buyers will not be informed which offer you have accepted; the buyer will only know, whether their offer has been accepted or not. Your chosen offer will be deleted from the blackboard and it is the turn of the next seller to make a choice among the remaining offers. If you have accepted an offer, we ask you to insert on your decision sheet the price, the desired quality and the potential price deduction into the box "Accepted Offer". Now you have to decide which quality level you will deliver. As already mentioned, the choice of a quality level is associated with quality costs that you have to bear. On the leaflet you will find the table with the feasible quality levels and the associated costs for you! Both the buyers and the sellers know this table. Please insert your actual quality level on your decision sheet in the row "Actual Quality". No other seller will be informed about your quality choice. We therefore ask you not to talk about your "actual quality". Each buyer is only informed about the "actual quality" of "his" seller. Moreover, the buyer will not learn the identity of "his" seller. Hence, the anonymity of your quality choice is completely secured.
Whether the potential price deduction is due or not, depends on your quality choice and on chance. If you have delivered or exceeded the desired quality you will receive the accepted price in any case and the price deduction is not exacted. If, however, your actual quality fell short of the desired quality, the price deduction may be implemented. Whether the price deduction is due, depends on the result of the following procedure: "your" buyer rolls a sixsided die. If the numbers 1 and 2 turn up, the price deduction will be implemented. If the numbers 3, 4, 5, or 6 show up, the price deduction will not be implemented. We will indicate whether the price deduction -in case of an under-provision of quality -is due or not, by checking the respective box on your decision sheet. You will receive this information after you have determined your actual quality level. You now have all necessary information to calculate your own payoff as well as the payoff of "your" seller. This ends a trading day and the next one starts. In total there will be 12 trading days during which you can earn money.
